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Abstract
We explore the spread of the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Lebanon
by adopting three different approaches, namely the SEIR model, a model of re-
peated iterations and a Fermi-Dirac-like model. We fit the first seventy five days of
available daily data since the first diagnosed case and we forecast possible scenar-
ios of contagion associated with different levels of social distancing measures. We
determine the initial reproductive transmission rate in Lebanon and its subsequent
dynamics. Our results suggest that preserving severe mitigation measures would
halt the spread of the disease. Nevertheless, relaxing measures would trigger a sec-
ond outbreak of infections within a couple of weeks, with severity depending on the
extent of relaxation.
Keywords: Covid-19; SEIR model; Fermi Dirac distribution; Mathematical modeling
in epidemiology; Compartmental Models
1 Introduction
The Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has been widely spreading worldwide since it
appeared in the city of Wuhan, China towards the end of December, 2019. The World
Health Organization classified the spread as a pandemic in March 2020 [1]. Europe and
the United States of America have endured the severest repercussions in terms of number
of infections and deaths. The US cases amounted to about one third of total global in-
fections by April 2020 [2]. Governmental and institutional reactions and measures varied
across countries with respect to the time of introduction of social distancing measures
(SDM, henceforth) and with respect to their degree of severity. In spite of some govern-
ments being slower in adopting mitigation measures and endorsing the epidemiological
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concept of herd immunity [3] to create a resistance to the contagion in the long run at the
expense of short term losses while keeping the economy functional, the majority adopted
SDM’s that reached countrywide lockdowns.
A considerable amount of research has been carried out focusing on the dynamics
and extent of the pandemic in different countries notably in the countries that witnessed
the first cases [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. In comparison with the most recent deadly mass
pandemic of the "Spanish flu" that hit the world after World War I during the years of
1918-1919 and recurred in two waves, and caused the death of tens of millions of people
[12, 13, 14, 15], the extent of the spread of COVID-19 has been far less. The question of
the containing COVID-19 and preventing its spread and expansion into a similar deadly
pandemic is a key motivation for the study of various models that describe, simulate
and forecast epidemics and dynamics of infections under different reproductive rates and
mitigation measures.
In Lebanon, the spread of COVID-19 coincided with a period of political turmoil,
few months of popular uprising [16, 17] and economic collapse finally depicted by the
default on debts in early March 2020 [18]. Additionally, the currency underwent severe
depreciation and the economic deterioration was acute before the COVID-19 related
lockdown that brought the economy further down [19, 20].
Lebanon SDM measure SDM were adopted at a relatively early stage in Lebanon.
While the first confirmed case was recorded on February 21, 2020, all academic institu-
tions, namely schools and universities, were closed starting the first of March. This was
followed by a resolution of "Public Mobilization" and ban of public gatherings that im-
posed closure of all churches, mosques, shops, restaurants, etc. except for grocery stores
and drugstores on March 22 [21]. Another subsequent measure consisted in constraining
vehicles’ mobility to alternating between odd- and even-ending plate numbers, while fully
prohibiting mobility on Sundays. The source of the first infection was documented to be
from a traveler coming from Iran [22, 23] where the spread of the virus had started early
on [24]. However, it has been discussed that many of the following first cases were trans-
mitted by travelers coming from the Vatican city during the early stages of the pandemic
spread there [25]. The efficacy of SDM’s can be examined by discerning the daily rate of
infection as shown in the daily data of the first seventy five days [26]. Our results were
obtained in relation to data available until May 9, 2020.
Literature and Methodology Models exploring contagion and particularly spread
of infections were developed and extensively studied in various fields of mathematics,
physics, economics and statistics [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. The effect of mitigation
measures on the spread of infections was studied in [35, 36, 37, 38]. It was shown that
the use of protective masks [39], combined with social distancing, ensures high levels
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of safety and protection. We establish our study of the dynamics of the COVID-19
spread in Lebanon on three models that have been used in analogous studies of infectious
diseases including COVID-19 worldwide and in other countries, namely: the SEIR model
[40, 41, 42], the repeated iterations model presented in [43] (henceforth the RI model) and
the Fermi-Dirac-like model of [44]. We use a daily data of the Coronavirus in Lebanon
provided by mainly the Ministry of Public Health [26] over the length of seventy five
days.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the three models.
Results and forecasts are discussed in section 3 and section 4 concludes the paper. 4.
2 Theoretical Framework
We describe here three models that we use to forecast the path of daily cases and to
measure the extent of the epidemic in Lebanon. Following an abrupt rise in infected
cases at the start, the rate has fallen to a significantly low level after implementation of
severe SDM’s, in comparison with other regional and country-level data [45]. Figure 2
illustrates the progression of the number of daily infections over time in different countries:
Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Italy and the USA. Day 0 represents the date of the first reported
infection. Lebanon has a relatively low number of infections per capita, despite the fact
that the first case was recorded relatively early. The proposed models accommodate for
the actual data and allow future predictions.
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Figure 1: Daily infections (per million) in Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Italy and the USA.
3
2.1 SEIR Model
The study of the spread of epidemics can be executed by the fundamental SIR model first
introduced by Kermack and McKendrick [46], that consists of dividing the population into
different compartments and investigating the contagion of the disease by examining the
rate of change of the sizes of these groups. Later versions were developed to accommodate
for different settings and assumptions [47, 48, 49]. We use here the SEIR model described
as follows. Consider a population N that we normalize to size 1 and divide into four
categories of individuals: susceptible S, exposed E, infectious I and removed (through
recovery or death) R. The cumulative number of cases is provided by C = I + R, since
each recorded case would at a given time be either infectious or recovered or dead. The
rates of change of these categories are given by dS
dt
, dE
dt
, dI
dt
and dR
dt
respectively. The model
can be formally described using the following differential equations:
dS
dt
= −βt S
N
I (1)
dE
dt
= βt
S
N
I − σE (2)
dI
dt
= σE − γI (3)
dR
dt
= γI (4)
with βt = Rtγ where βt is the rate at which infected individuals bump into others
(the S
N
susceptibles), σ is the rate at which exposed individuals become infected and it is
associated to the mean incubation period; γ is rate of exit by recovery or death per-day
and it is associated to the average illness period. Rt is the ratio of meeting rate to exit
rate; it determines the transmission from susceptible to infected and is a proxy for social
distancing measures. There are several ways to model Rt. It can be taken as a constant
parameter in some circumstances, or a time dependent function as in [40].
In our model, using data available from the first 75 days in Lebanon, we assume that
Rt can be parameterized by the step function
Rt =
R0 0 < t < t1R1 t > t1 (5)
after the application of SDM, and before any relaxation. When the measures are
loosened after an initial period of SDM, then Rt would be parameterized as follows:
4
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Figure 2: Cumulative number of infections according to the SEIR model in Lebanon, with
appropriate parameterization with R0 = 5.6 for the first 32 days and R1 = 0.65 after-
wards. The actual cases are represented in black and the expected cumulative infections
are in brown.
Rt =

R0 0 < t < t1
R1 t1 < t < t2
R2 t > t2
(6)
where R0, R1 and R2 are constant parameters that depend on the severity of mea-
sures and commitment to those measures, with R1 < R2 < R0. R0 is the reproductive
transmission rate of the disease in the initial phase, while R1 and R2 are the reproductive
transmission factors under strict and relaxed SDM respectively. We also take σ = 1
5.2
in relation to an average period of incubation of 5.2 days, and γ = 1
20
in relation to an
average period of recovery (or death) of 20 days.
Assuming that initially no SDM are applied, R0 represents the transmission of disease
with no mitigation measures. In [50] they adopt R0 = 3.1, while in [51] they take
values between 2.76 and 3.25, and [40] considers different values between 3 and 1.6.
Recent studies reveal that R0 of COVID-19 can assume higher values up to 3.87, 5.7
and 6.47 according to data analyzed from each of Mexico and China [52, 53, 54]. After
introduction of measures, Rt can assume values less than 1 in case extremely severe
mitigation measures are applied [55]. It was well established that COVID-19 has higher
R0 than other infections like SARS [56]. The estimation of R0 and Rt is essential for
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forecasting the spread, but their determination depends on the available data and the
accuracy of the reporting of initial cases and dates. More accurate values of R0 and Rt
usually become available after the maturation of the spread [57, 58].
We assume that the initial value of I is I0 = 16M , in line with the first initial case in
Lebanon reported on February 21 and a gross population of 6 million inhabitants. We take
E0 = 12I0 to account for the fact that the initial case registered had been in contact with
many people on a flight from Iran which raises the number of initially exposed people.
This entails some uncertainty in the initial conditions of the spread. In comparison, in
[40], they consider a value I0 = 110M with 33 initial cases in the United States whose
population stands at around 330 millions, and E0 = 4I0 given 132 individuals were
initially carrying but not contagious, acknowledging the considerable uncertainty related
to initial cases in the US.
In our model we find that R0 = 5.6 and R1 = 0.65 for t1 = 32 days and t2 = 80 days,
provide the best prediction for registered cumulative cases, and then we simulate four
possible future scenarios with R2 = 0.65, 1.3, 1.9 and 2.5 after t2 = 80 days
2.2 The RI model
We consider another model that takes into account the most recent available daily data of
confirmed and recovered (or dead) cases. Here we implement a variation of the repeated
iterations method proposed in [43]. Denote the currently infected daily values by Ii where
i is the index of days and i ∈ [1, n]. We take the last m values of Ii to determine the
average arithmetic gross rate in the last m days according to
Ga =
1
m
n∑
i=n−m+1
(
Ii
Ii−1
− 1
)
(7)
while the average geometric gross rate of the same set of data is defined by
Gg =
(
Ii
Ii−m
) 1
m
(8)
Each of Ga or Gg allows us to forecast the number of people infected for i > n by
simply implementing a progression for the following days according to
Ii+1 = Ii (1 +Ga) (9)
using the arithmetic gross infection rate Ga or alternatively
Ii+1 = IiGg (10)
using the geometric gross infection rate Gg.
6
It is important to note that we also have to take into account the number of people
dead or recovered at later dates. To account for this, we denote the death rate by p,
the recovery rate by 1 − p, the average number of days needed for recovery by h and
the average number of days between infection and death by d. This means that on day
i+1, the number of deaths will be p (Ii−d − Ii−d−1) where the term in brackets represents
the number of people who caught the virus d days ago. Similarly the number of people
recovered would be proportional to the number of people who caught the virus h days
ago, thus it is given by (1− p) (Ii−h − Ii−h−1). Our recursive relation includes the number
of dead or recovered people as predicted from the people who got the infection h and d
days ago respectively. The values of p and h vary in the literature and in the available
data from the specific country considered.
Then the repeated iterations model forecasts the net number of infected people by
(Ii+1)net = Ii+1 − p (Ii−d − Ii−d−1)− (1− p) (Ii−h − Ii−h−1) (11)
This model is a general model and not country specific. From available data in
Lebanon, it is reasonable to take p = 0.04, h = 20 days and d = 24 days. Note that
in this iteration, we use the available data to forecast the next unavailable day, and
recalculate G accordingly, hence recursively predicting the future development of the
rate and the number of infected people. Here we will consider m = 14 previous days, and
forecast the next upcoming 14 days as well. The interesting feature of the RI model is
that as new daily data is revealed, we can easily update our daily future forecast, hence
have a new 14 day future expectation every day.
G is a dynamic quantity and it will depend on the rapidness and strictness of the
public policies of social distancing, ban of public gatherings and curfews, as well as on
the commitment of people to those measures and to health measures (sanitation, wearing
protective masks, gloves...). This is why, to forecast future situations, we have to take
into account different scenarios and possibilities for the progression of G in relation to
those measures and practices. In our simulations, we explore the predictions based on
Ga, Gg, the maximum attained value of G in the past m days as well as possible absolute
increases or decreases in those rates.
2.3 Fermi-Dirac like Model
The idea of using a Fermi Dirac like model to study the progression of the cumulative
number of infections was proposed by [44]. It is based on the assumption that the maxi-
mum number of possible infected people P is a known parameter, with C(t) representing
the cumulative number of infections at time t. Then the percentage of the people who
will be infected later is given by P−C(t)
P
. In a time interval ∆t and with coefficient n
representing the number of interactions between an infected and non-infected persons,
7
the number of people who would catch the infection is proportional to
(
P−C(t)
P
)
n∆t. We
use this to derive the difference equation that determines the number of people catching
the infection between times t and ∆t.
This is given by:
C(t+ ∆t)− C(t)
∆t
= D
(
P − C(t)
P
)
C(t) (12)
where D represents the frequency of infection and is directly proportional to n. In a
short time interval dt, it leads to the differential relation
dC(t)
dt
= D
(
P − C(t)
P
)
C(t) (13)
Integrating equation (13) we can determine the cumulative number of infected people
at a time t by:
C(t)
P
=
1
me−Dt + 1
(14)
where m is an integration constant, and C(t) saturates into P after enough time t.
This can be more accurately applied on data from countries where the disease has already
advanced and started reaching some early levels of saturation in order to predict the time
remaining for reaching its maximum short term spread and the daily changes until then,
with the appropriate parameters m and D.
The expression in (14) is a distorted variation of the well-known Fermi-Dirac distri-
bution for m 6= 1 and has a strong resemblance to the FD distribution [59, 60] expressed
by
F () =
1
e(−µ)/kBT + 1
(15)
D plays a role analogous to the energy of a Fermi gas ( − µ), while t is associated
to the Boltzmann factor β = 1
kBT
, T is the temperature of the Fermi gas and kB is the
Boltzmann constant.
3 Results
3.1 SEIR
In our specific parameterization of the SEIR model for the pattern of cases registered in
Lebanon, we found that the initial value of the reproductive transmission factor is very
high and starts at R0 = 5.6 but then significantly decreases to R1 = 0.65 at t1 = 32
days. This parameterization supplies an accurate fit with the registered cases for the
8
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Figure 3: The reproduction transmission factor R(t) as a function of time t in days. It
starts at R0 = 5.6 then falls down at t = 32 days to R1 = 0.65 after strong mitigation
measures. At t = 80 days, we inspect four possible scenarios of R2, with values equal to
0.65, 1.3, 1.9 and 2.5 in black, blue, brown and red respectively.
first 75 days. In addition to absence of any SDM, a relatively high value of R0 could be
attributed to late reporting or under reporting of the early cases, hence the fast surge of
registered results during the first few days of official testing. R0 here reflects the fast pace
of spread of the disease in the early days before taking and implementing social distancing
measures. The rapid fall of the rate from R0 to R1 occurs after the implementation and
the social commitment to mitigation measures, hence the rapid decrease in the number
of daily infections and the slow increase in the cumulative number of infections. The
very low rate of R1 sharply diminishes the number of new infections, and the curve of
the cumulative number of infections (Figure 2) starts flattening out slowly.
However, if the measures are relaxed at a time t2 = 80 days, we expect a an increase
in the reproductive rate from R1 to a another constant value R2. The exact value of
R2 will still depend on the extent of relaxation and the public commitment to SDM.
We considered here four possible values of R2: Continued strict mitigation measures
with R2 = R1 = 0.65, a continued commitment to measures with weak relaxation is
parameterized by R2 = 1.3 while more public social interaction and moderate relaxation
is parameterized by R2 = 1.9. The last choice is R2 = 2.5, corresponding to wide
relaxation, yet panic among people helps in preventing R2 from returning back to high
values as those of the initial rate R0.
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Figure 4: Cumulative number of infections with measures eased on t = 80 days. The
figure represents a forecast with four relaxation scenarios, with R2 = 0.65, 1.3, 1.9 and
2.5, plotted in black, blue, brown and red respectively in correspondence with Figure 3
We find out that the cumulative number of infections will rise again at a higher pace
as depicted in Figure 4 even for the lowest increase in R2. The number of cumulative
infections can reach a total varying between 1791 to more than 8271 infections in July
2020, depending on the extent of relaxation. On the contrary, a continued commitment to
SDM measures on the same levels as R1 would lead to a controlled total of 1086 infections
by then. This means that the disease can swiftly spread again once the measures are
relaxed, and the pace of the spread would depend on the level of official and public
relaxation of mitigation measures. This is a result numerically specific to Lebanon, but
the general pattern is a universal outcome and means that a second wave of COVID-19
infections is inevitable in absence or weakening of SDM.
3.2 RI model
The arithmetic and geometric means proposed in equations (7) and (8) of the repeated
iterations model assume that all SDM will be maintained at their current levels in the
upcoming m days under consideration. But this is not necessarily the case. In order to
take into account possible changes we considered the following scenarios that we simulated
in figure 5:
1. We determine the arithmetic and the geometric means of the last 14 days and
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Figure 5: Number of currently infected people according to the RI model. The colored
lines represent the progression of the number of currently infected people in the next
14 days according to five possible scenarios. The lower pink line corresponds to an
absolute decrease of 1% in the current rate of infection. The middle black and brown
lines almost coincide and they correspond to the continuation of the current geometric
and arithmetic average rate of infection. The red line represents a progression with a rate
corresponding to the maximal attained daily rate of the last 14 days, while the upper
green line corresponds to an absolute increase of 2% in current average rate.
the corresponding future forecasts are plotted in brown and black respectively. It
is clear that with the rate infection registered in Lebanon, and with more people
recovered, the number of currently infected people would almost stabilize during
the upcoming couple of weeks, and the geometric and arithmetic means considered
lead to very similar forecasts.
2. The rate of infection decreases by an absolute value of 2% and the number of
recovered people is also on the rise so the total number of currently infected people
slowly decreases faster.
3. The rate of progression is defined as the maximum of the rates of increase recorded
in the past fourteen days
Gmax = Max
{
Gg i−(m−1) , Gg i−(m−2) , ....Gg i
}
with an increment of 1% in absolute rate. The number of current infections will
continue increasing despite of recoveries and deaths.
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Figure 6: Cumulative number of infected people according to a Fermi-Dirac like model.
The green line represents the actual cumulative number of infections in Lebanon. The
black line represents the Fermi-Dirac distribution that fits the cumulative data with
m = 67.7 and d = 0.0947, with a future forecast of 15 upcoming days, assuming all
current measures and rates remain constant.
4. The mean rate of infection increases by an absolute rate of 2%, and the number
of currently infected people would rise quickly despite recoveries or deaths from
previous cases.
As in the SEIR future forecasts, the different scenarios depend directly on the official
measures as well as on public behavior and social distancing. If social life returns back
to a more normal situation and the precautions are diminished, the number of infections
will be on the rise again according to scenarios 3 or 4. The continued enforcement of
prevailing measures will help implement scenario 1 or more optimistically scenario 2 in
case of more public commitment (Figure 5).
3.3 Fermi-Dirac model
Using the Fermi-Dirac distribution function provided in equation (14), and fitting with
m = 67.7 and d = 0.0947, we obtain a fit for the available actual data from Lebanon,
with saturation attained at P = 900 total cases within two upcoming weeks. The curve
allows us to forecast the progression of the cumulative number of cases until saturation,
provided that the infection rate continues with the same dynamics. The curve in figure
6 implies similar conclusions to what we confer from the SEIR and the RI models in
the case of the continuation of current SDM, with a slow and controlled increase in the
cumulative number of infections. The fast increase in the rate of infection followed by
the fast flattening of the curve also confirms the results obtained from the SEIR model
under similar conditions.
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Figure 7: The figure shows the number of daily tests conducted per 1 million inhabitants
for each of Italy (Blue), Turkey (Brown), Lebanon (Green), Iran (Black) and USA (Red).
3.4 Discussions
The low infection rate in Lebanon in the last weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic could be
attributed to public commitment to social distancing and the strict mitigation measures
applied. The number and the distribution of tests conducted could also be a factor in
revealing or hiding the real scope and rate of infections.
To asses this factor, we compare the number of daily tests conducted per million
inhabitants, in Lebanon and several other countries that witnessed stronger spreads like
Italy, USA, Iran and Turkey. We can find that the percentage of people tested in Lebanon
is similar to that conducted in Iran, and tends to rise up with time but it is significantly
less than the other countries as Figure 7 shows. This could in principle lower the detected
infections especially among people with very mild symptoms who might opt not to test
themselves, despite being positive.
To further asses this effect, it is important to check the ratio of the cumulative number
of infections with respect to the cumulative numbers of tests conducted. This criterion
would give the rate of infected out those of tested, hence eliminates the uncertainty
related to under-testing. A inspection of the publically available data reveals that the
cumulative rate of infection among those who were tested in Lebanon was 1.65% on May
9th, 2020, compared to 14.56% in the USA, 8.54% in Italy, 10.12% in Turkey and 18.34%
in Iran [2]. This is an assertion that the low rate of infection is much more related to the
mitigation measures applied in the country, as rates in more affected countries are larger
by several orders of magnitude.
However, the relaxation of measures and the rise of the reproductive rate of infections
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due to increased interaction can easily bring the country back to a high rate of infections
within a couple of weeks as the forecast presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5 reveal. This
is confirmed by our future simulations on both of the SEIR and the RI models, following
two different methodologies with several possible scenarios. The aforementioned models
both forecast a resumption of a quick spread of the disease and an increase in the number
of infected people once the SDM are reduced or abandoned. The severity of the spread
depends on the extent of the relaxation. The currently achieved pattern of slow and
controlled spread can slide into a swift and wider spread under looser conditions.
Under all circumstances, the continued SDM are essential to keep COVID-19 under
control until the introduction of effective medications or vaccines, which is estimated
to take at least between 12 to 18 months [61, 62], despite ongoing medical and clinical
research around the globe [63, 64, 65, 66].
4 Conclusion
This work presented three different models used in the simulation of the spread of infec-
tious diseases which are the SEIR model, the RI model and a Fermi-Dirac model. We
developed some variations to the models and adjusted the parameters to fit the available
data from Lebanon. We analyzed in detail the current spread and different forecasts for
future developments. We find out that the rate of infection and the number of infected
people fell down quickly due to the rapid fall in the reproductive number R due to strong
mitigation measures. However, relaxing the measures and the resumption of social activ-
ity and interaction would swiftly put the infections on a rapid rise again, thus reversing
the temporary success in limiting the spread of COVID-19. Attacking the disease from
different angles allows us to show in different ways that the temporary official and public
SDM have succeeded in halting the spread of the disease, but the resumption of business
and life as usual will put the spread back on track of fast growth. Consequently, SDM
should be maintained in order to safely guarantee controlled spread.
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